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ABSTRACT 
Previous research on anchoring has shown this heuristic to be a very robust psychological 
phenomenon ubiquitous across many domains of human judgment and decision-making. 
Despite the prevalence of anchoring effects, researchers have only recently begun to 
investigate the underlying factors responsible for how and in what ways a person is susceptible 
to them. This paper examines how one such factor, the Big-Five personality trait of openness-
to-experience, influences the effect of previously presented anchors on participants’ judgments. 
Our findings indicate that participants high in openness-to-experience were significantly more 
influenced by anchoring cues relative to participants low in this trait. These findings were 
consistent across two different types of anchoring tasks providing convergent evidence for our 
hypothesis. 
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The anchoring effect (e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wilson, Houston, Etling, & 
Brekke, 1996) refers to the adjustment of one’s assessment, 
higher or lower, based upon previously presented 
external information or an “anchor.” The anchoring 
heuristic appears to be prevalent throughout human decision 
processes and has been shown to reliably influence 
judgments in a variety of domains including probability 
estimates (Plous, 1989; Tversky n& Kahneman, 1974), 
negotiation (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Ritov, 1996), legal 
judgments (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996), and general 
knowledge (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Jacowitz 
& Kahnman, 1995; Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 
1996). Further, anchoring effects appear viable across 
most situations for both novices and experts (Northcraft 
& Neale, 1987) and seem to be effective under conditions 
of monetary incentives (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; 
Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996; Wright & Anderson, 
1989) and in real-world settings (Northcraft & 
Neale, 1987; Cervone & Peak, 1986). 
 
Anchoring thus appears to be a very robust psychological 
phenomenon. However, not all individuals may 
be equally influenced by anchoring cues. Identification 
of factors that influence how and in what ways a person 
is susceptible to this heuristic should further the understanding 
of the process. One avenue of approach is to 
investigate the role of individual difference factors. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) pointed to the important 
role of “personal characteristics” of the decision 
maker in risky choice situations. Later work by Stanovich 
and West (1998; 2000) suggested that intellectual traits 
influence decision making and consequential choice preference. 
Recently, individual differences have been found 
in numerical reliance (Bartels, 2006; McElroy & Seta, 
2003; Peters, Vastfall, & Slovic, 2006; Simon, Fagley, 
& Halleran, 2004), ambiguity (Lauriola & Levin, 2001; 
Nowlis, Kahn, & Dhar, 2002), preference for actions or 
inactions (Baron & Ritov, 2004) and the optimistic bias 
(Buehler&Griffin, 2003). The Big-Five personality traits 
(Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Levin, Gaeth, & Schreiber, 
2002) have proven to be important individual difference 
factors for understanding decision choices. Further, attesting 
to the importance of individual differences, Levin 
and Hart (2003) demonstrated that individual differences 
in preference appear to originate at a very early age. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the impact of 
 
individual difference factors on decision-making is both 
profound and pervasive. 
 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate 
how one individual difference factor may influence the 
strength of the anchoring effect. Specifically, we are interested 
in how individual differences in the personality 
trait of openness-to-experience influences anchoring effects. 
Openness-to-experience. In the last couple of decades 
the five-factor model of personality has become the most 
widely tested and well-regarded personality trait model. 
A great deal of research has supported this model’s validity 
and reliability (Goldberg, 1981; John, 1990; Mc- 
Crae & Costa, 1987). While most research has agreed 
on the nature of the first four factors, the nature of the 
fifth factor has been controversial; a controversy predominately 
based upon whether a lexical approach, derived 
from language frequency within the lexicon of a particular 
language (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996), or a questionnaire 
approach (McCrae & Costa, 1997) should be used 
to measure it. 
 
The fifth factor is often labeled openness-to-experience, 
which refers to a propensity to adjust 
beliefs and behaviors when exposed to new types of 
information or ideas (John, 1990). Individuals scoring 
high on this dimension are more open to new ideas 
(McCrae, 1987) and motivated to seek variety and 
external experience. Individuals scoring low tend to be 
less inclined to consider alternative opinions and are 
more steadfast in their own beliefs (John, 1990) making 
them more likely to rely upon information that is familiar 
and conventional (McCrae & Costa, 1997). 
 
A fundamental aspect of the anchoring effect is that individuals 
are sensitive to information which they have experienced. 
This change in judgment, which is based upon 
external cues, seems particularly relevant and related to 
the openness-to-experience personality trait. Specifically, 
as research has shown, the openness trait reflects individual 
propensities to “adjust” one’s beliefs (John, 1990) and 
to consider external information (McCrae, 1987). 
 
Therefore, based upon the nature of the openness-to-experience 
trait and the processes involved in the anchoring 
effect, we hypothesize that individual differences 
in openness-to-experience will influence susceptibility to 
anchoring effects. Specifically, we hypothesize that the 
judgments of those individuals high in this trait will be 
more influenced by previously presented anchors whereas 
those individuals low in this trait will be less influenced 
by the anchor. To test this hypothesis, we first measured 
individual levels of the personality trait of openness-to-experience. 
We then provided participants with an anchoring 
task involving either the Mississippi river (Study 
1) or African nations in the UN (Study 2). 
 
 
2 EXPERIMENT 1 
 
2.1 Method 
 
2.1.1 Participants and design 
 
We distributed questionnaires to a sample of 197 undergraduate 
students at Appalachian State University1. The design 
of our study included the observed variable of 
openness-to-experience and our manipulated variable of 
anchor (high, low). Participants’ estimates of the length 
of the Mississippi river served as our dependent variable. 
 
 
2.1.2 Procedure and materials 
 
All participants were first informed about the nature of 
our study. After consenting to take part in the study, 
participants were presented with the ten-item personality 
inventory, otherwise known as TIPI (Gosling, Rentfrow, 
& Swann, 2003). The TIPI contains two separate 
items that address each of the Big-Five factors (e.g., extraverted, 
self-disciplined, anxious, warm, calm, uncreative). 
In this scale, participants are asked to rate the extent 
that they feel each of the traits applies to them. All 
responses to these items were made on a 7-point scale. 
This measure was utilized because of its accuracy and 
brevity in assessing individual differences pertaining to 
the Five-Factor Model. Despite having somewhat diminished 
psychometric properties due to its truncated length, 
the TIPI has nonetheless shown adequate test-retest reliability. 
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that the 
TIPI has convergence validity with widely used Big-Five 
measures and convergence between self and observer ratings 
(Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). 
 
After completing the TIPI scale, participants were presented 
with a traditional anchoring task involving the 
Mississippi river (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). In this 
task, participants were first asked to estimate whether the 
length of the Mississippi river is more or less than 200 or 
20,000 miles; this initial activity serves as the “anchor”. 
Participants were then asked to estimate the exact length 
of the Mississippi river. All participants were then informed 
about the nature of our study, thanked, and released 
from the study. 
 
 
2.2 Results 
 
In order to investigate whether the personality factor of 
openness-to-experience influenced participants’ susceptibility 
to the anchor, we performed a regression analysis 
with anchor (high, low) and participants’ openness-toexperience 
scores serving as our independent variables. 
Participants’ estimates of the length of the Mississippi 
river acted as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed 
a significant interaction (F (1, 191) = 7.72, p < 
.007) indicating a greater anchoring effect for greater levels 
of openness-to-experience (see Table 1). In the high 
anchor condition, participants level of openness had a significant 
effect on their estimates (F (1, 95) = 4.9, p < 
.03) such that, higher levels of openness were associated 
with higher estimates. In the low anchor condition we 
again found significant results for openness and participants 
estimates (F (1, 96) = 11.25, p < .002), indicating 
that higher levels of openness were associated with lower 
estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We also wanted to examine whether any of the other 
Big-Five personality traits may have an influence on susceptibility 
to anchoring cues. In order to investigate this, 
we performed a regression analysis with each of the remaining 
four trait scores and anchor as independent variables 
and participants’ estimates of the length of the Mississippi 
river as the dependent variable. These analyses 
revealed no significant interaction effects for any of the 
remaining Big-Five traits: extraversion (F (1, 191) = 1.97, 
p > .16), agreeableness (F (1, 191) = 1.0, p > .3), conscientiousness 
(F (1, 191) = .4, p > .5) and emotional stability 
(F (1, 191) = .85, p > .36). 
3 EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Study 2 was designed to test for a conceptual replication 
of our findings involving the openness trait and its influence 
on anchoring effects. In Study 1 we used the traditional 
Mississippi river anchoring task, however, in Study 
2 we wanted to examine our hypothesis using a different 
scenario. Therefore, in this experiment we used an anchoring 
task involving the percentage of African nations 
in the United Nations. 
 
 
3.1 Participants and design 
 
We distributed questionnaires to 200 undergraduate psychology 
students at Appalachian State University2. Similar 
to Study 1, the design of our experiment included the 
independent variables of participants’ level of opennessto- 
experience and anchor (high, low). Participants’ esti- 
mates of the percentage of African nations in the United 
Nations served as our dependent variable. 
 
 
3.1.1 Procedure and materials 
 
After consenting to take part in our study, participants 
were first presented with the TIPI Big-Five personality 
scale. After completing the scale, participants were presented 
with our anchoring task (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). In this task, we first asked participants whether 
the percentage of African nations that are members of 
the United Nations is more or less than 85 (high anchor 
condition) or 25 (low anchor condition). We then asked 
participants to estimate the exact percentage of African 
nations. 
 
 
3.2 Results 
 
As was the case in Study 1, we wanted to examine 
whether high and low openness-to-experience participants 
differed in their susceptibility to anchors. To do 
so, we performed a regression analysis with participants’ 
openness scores and anchor as our independent variables 
and participants’ estimates of percentage of African nations 
in the UN as our dependent variable. 
 
Similar to Study 1, we found a significant interaction 
between openness scores and anchor (F (1, 195) = 4.95, 
p < .03) again, indicating greater anchoring effects for 
greater levels of openness (see Table 2). Further analysis 
revealed that, in the high anchor condition, participants 
level of openness was significantly related to their estimates 
(F (1, 97) = 9.77, p < .003) with greater openness 
scores associated with greater estimates. In the low anchor 
condition however, no significant relationship was 
found between openness and participants estimates (F (1, 
98) = .03, p > .8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As was the case in Study 1, we also wanted to examine 
whether any of the remaining Big-Five personality 
traits may be influencing susceptibility to anchoring cues. 
Therefore, we again performed separate regression analyses 
with the remaining Big-Five personality traits and anchor 
cue acting as independent variables and estimates of 
the percentage of African nations in the UN as the dependent 
variable. These analyses revealed no significant interaction 
effects for any other Big-Five personality traits: 
extraversion (F (1, 195) = .01, p > .9), agreeableness (F 
(1, 195) = .14, p > .7), conscientiousness (F (1, 195) = 
.34, p > .56) and emotional stability (F (1, 195) = .27, p 
<.11). 
 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper we set out to test whether the fifth factor of 
openness-to-experience, as depicted by McCrae & Costa 
(1997; 1999), may influence individual sensitivity to anchor 
cues and in turn, individual judgments. Across two 
separate tasks involving estimates about the length of the 
Mississippi river (Study 1) and membership of African 
nations in the UN (Study 2) we examined the hypothesis 
that individuals high in the personality trait of opennessto- 
experience would be more influenced by a previously 
presented anchor relative to individuals low in this trait. 
We found partial support for this hypothesis. Our findings 
demonstrated that high openness-to-experience participants 
were more influenced by high and low anchoring 
cues for the Mississippi river estimation task but only for 
high anchors in the African nations task. 
 
Limitations. Several limitations are present within the 
current studies. First, the measure we selected to assess 
openness-to-experience was chosen because of its conciseness 
and brevity; however, its short length comes at 
the expense of reliability, a psychometric limitation that 
is indigenousness to all short instruments. Furthermore, 
the TIPI scale, again due to its length, is able to offer 
only a broad assessment of the Big-Five personality constructs. 
The Big-Five dimensions are principally broad 
constructs that can be broken down into several related 
but discrete components. For example, it has been argued 
that openness-to-experience consists of several narrower 
facet-level constructs, such as creativity and intelligence. 
As noted by its authors, the TIPI is unable to 
provide scores for these facet-level constructs, which are 
often better predictors of specific criteria (Gosling, Rentfrow, 
& Swann, 2003). Though the TIPI scale offered a 
sensible option for the present studies, future research investigating 
how personality traits mediate susceptibility 
to anchoring cues may benefit from investing in multiitem 
measures of the Big-Five to avoid these limitations. 
 
Another potential problem surfaces around the fact that 
we found our strongest evidence within the high anchor 
condition. Because our findings were largely driven by 
the high anchoring condition in Study 2, it is possible that 
our results could be an artifact of high openness individuals 
making higher estimates in general. More specifically, 
it could be the case that high openness participants have 
a general tendency to estimate higher numbers relative to 
low openness individuals, especially in Study 2. In order 
to examine this possibility, we provided a separate set of 
participants with either the Mississippi length estimation 
task or the African nations task without the presence of 
an anchor. If it is the case that greater levels of openness 
lead to greater number estimations then we would expect 
correlations indicative of this relationship. Our results 
did not reveal a significant correlation between openness 
scores and participants’ estimates for either the Mississippi 
river task (r (33) = .2 p >.24) or the African nations 
task (r (33) = .02 p >.87). Thus, these results provide 
evidence that our earlier findings were not just due to a 
relationship between openness and estimation tendency. 
Rather, the nonexistence of such a correlation supports 
our contention that higher levels of openness lead individuals 
to become relatively more influenced by anchoring 
cues. 
Future research. The fact that we found differences for 
openness and low anchors in one study and not the other 
raises some interesting questions for future research. For 
example, It could be the case that we experienced a “floor 
effect”3, in that, anchor-free estimates for the African nations 
study may be closer to low anchor estimates relative 
to the Mississippi river study. Although speculative, this 
could be why high openness participants did not appear 
to be as affected by the low anchor in the African nations 
study. In order to attempt to provide a post-hoc observation 
of this possibility, we collapsed across our openness 
variable and only observed mean estimates for the high 
and low anchor conditions for both our studies as well 
as our anchor-free study. Observation of this data across 
studies reveals that the anchor free estimates of the Mississippi 
river length (M = 4681.50) fell roughly between 
the average estimates in the high anchor (M = 8497.28) 
and low anchor (M = 904.66) conditions. The African nations 
anchor-free study yielded a mean (M = 35.15) that 
appears descriptively closer to the low anchor mean (M 
= 34.91) than the high anchor mean (M = 37.77). While 
this is only a post-hoc observation, it does provide an interesting 
possibility for future research. 
 
These findings also pose interesting questions about 
how individual differences in openness-to-experience 
may influence judgments for other heuristics and biases 
as well. This should be especially true for decision tasks 
where reliance on external information is involved. One 
example of when external cues influence judgments is 
the framing effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Previous 
research has found a relationship between openness 
and risk preference, such that, high openness individuals 
demonstrated relatively more risk-seeking in 
their choices for typical framing tasks (Lauriola & Levin, 
2001; Levin, Gaeth, Schneider, & Lauriola, 2002). Future 
research may want to explore whether this effect is 
due to reliance on external information (e.g., the frame) 
or whether it represents a general tendency among high 
openness individuals. 
 
Another interesting question that emerges is whether 
individuals low in openness-to-experience may be influenced 
by other factors when making judgments. Specifically, 
just as high openness-to-experience individuals 
were more influenced by external anchoring cues, might 
it be the case that low openness individuals are more influenced 
by internally generated information? While we 
did not explore this question in our current set of studies 
it certainly raises questions for future research. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Two participants were excluded from our analysis because their 
“estimates” were extremely high and were more than 3 standard devia- 
tions from the mean. Statistically significant results were still obtained 
when these participants were included in our analysis, however, we did 
not feel that it was representative of our findings. One participant was 
not included in our analysis because they did not complete the questionnaire. 
 
2. One participant in our study failed to provide an estimate and was 
not included in our analysis of the data. 
 
3. Special thanks to the reviewers for pointing this out. 
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